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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY, a corporation as Trustee, and PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVING & LOAN
ASSOCIATION, a Corporation
Plaintiffs and Respondants
vs.
PAYLESS BUILDERS SUPPLY, a Utah
Corporation, ELLIS J. ROBINSON
and ELIZA S. ROBINSON
Defendants and Appellants
and

CASE
No. 10269

MOUNT OLYMPUS COVE, BREITLING BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, SECURITY TITLE CO.,
WILLIAM R. WALLACE, UTAH
SAND & GRAVEL PRODUCTS CORPORATION, MAX G. FRAMPTOM,
MURRAY STATE BANK, R. W.
FRANK&CO.
Defendants and Respondants
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
The case in an action brought by the plaintiffs
against the defendants to foreclose a trust deed as a
mortgage on real propertly situate in Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, described as:
All of Lot 15, Mount Olympus Cove, according to the
plat thereof recorded in the office of the Salt Lake
County Recorder.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
At the time of the pre-trial hearing on September
10, 1964, and without prior written notice, the plaintiff's
attorney, as the record of the pre-trial proceedings discloses, moved the pre-trial judge for entry of summary
judgment, which over the objection of the appellant's
attorney was granted. Findings and conclusions together
with a decree of foreclosure were prepared and entered,
and the property was sold to satisfy the debt. There are
two returns of the sheriff in the file, the latter apparently
purporting to supersede the former. The latter return
evidences a deficiency both in favor of the plaintiff and
in favor of Mount Olympus Cove.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek to have the decree, findings
and conclusions, together with the sheriff's sale vacated
and the case remanded for the trial of the issues of fact
and law presented by the pleadings.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The only record upon which we rely consists of
the pleadings and the pre-trial order. There exists in the
file a document entitled "findings of fact and conclusions
of law", but the record does not appear to contain either
discovery proceedings or any evidence except on the
question of attorney's fees, upon which said findings,
conclusions, and decree can be based. A recitation of facts
in this brief would then be tantamount to testifying, a
procedure not within the contemplation of the rules
pertaining to appellate practice. The undisputed facts
however disclose that Payless Builders Supply acquired
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a lot from Mount Olympus Cove for the purpose of building a home, and that out of the transaction with Mount
Olympus Cove, a certain indebtedness arose. The details
of the same are not entirely know except through informal discussion with counsel. The exhibits reflected
on page 74 of the record were "admitted in evidence"
but are not longer in the file. They were apparently
withdrawn by the attorneys who brought them to court.
The appellants do not dispute the fact that Payless
Builders Supply borrowed some money from Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan Association with which to
construct a building on the subject property. While
the partially legible exhibits to the plaintiff's complaint
disclose some of the details of the transaction, all of
the facts with respect thereto are also not know,
particularly those relating to the dates and amounts of
the interim partial disbursements of the loan proceeds,
the accruing interest on the disbursements, credits for
payments made thereupon and for rents received from
the tenant in possession during the pendency of the
action. The appellants allege affirmatively, although
there is no competent evidence in the record respecting
the same, that there is now, and that there has been
for a considerable length of time, a party in possession
of the premises, whose identity is not know and who
has not been placed there by the appellants. It is believed
that the party in possession is there with the permission
of the plaintiff.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS GRANTED WITHOUT BENEFIT OF THE
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TEN DAYS NOTICE REQUIRED BY THE UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
The principles governing motions made in trial
courts and elsewhere are set forth in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. All motions except those made during
a trial must be made a writing and argument made upon
notice prescribed by these rules. With respect to summary
judgments, the party against whom the relief is sought
is entitled to ten days written notice, exanded to thirteen
if the notice is served by mail. Applicable rules are set
forth in Rule 6 ( e) and Rule 56 ( c) which provide that the
motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for hearing unless the same is mailed in which
case three days is to be added to the prescribed time.
The record of the pre-trial proceedings disclose the
following:
"At the time of the pre-trial, the plaintiff's counsel, Earl P. Staten made a motion for summary
judgement which court granted."
POINT II
EVEN WITH PROPER NOTICE, THE COURT
WOULD HAVE ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION WITH THE PLEADINGS REFLECTING THE
VARIOUS UNRESOLVED ISSUES OF FACT INVOLVED.
Summary Judgment will only lie in cases where
there are no issues of fact and where the trial court can
dispose of the disputes and contentions as a matter of
law. Governing principles are set forth in rule 56. The
important language is in paragraph ( c) which authorizes
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entry of judgment when there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and when the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. In determining this
issue, one cannot go outside of the pleadings to speculate
what the evidence might be. It is not argued that the facts
would be hard for the plaintiff to prove in order to obtain
some sort of relief. It is simply an issue of whether the
pleadings, in their present from, indicate that there are
facts that are neither proven nor admitted, placing them
at issue and putting the burden on theplaintiff of either
establishing them by discovery or by competent evidence.
Courts, in ruling on motions for summary judgment
are confronted with finding whether there are any issues,
not trying to resolve them. If the pleadings raise issues
of fact, the only proper action that may be taken is set the
matter down for trial. No authorities are citied on this
point because the rule seems to be well established. The
cases simply reaffirm that the rule means what it says.
If issues of fact are present in the pleadings, the motion
for summary judgment must be denied.
It should be observed that no interrogatories or requests for admissions were served. Neither were any
depositions taken. The only record that exists is the
aggregation of the various complaints, counter-claims,
cross-complaints and the various answers thereto, together with the pre-trial order and the findings, conclusions, and decree.

POINT III
THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO PROVE BY
COMPETENT EVIDENCE THE MATERIAL ELEMENTS OF THEIR CAUSE OF ACTION.
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The record discloses that certain exhibits, namely
notes and mortgages, were "Admitted in Evidence." The
transcript does not disclose how. There is not one word
about offering or tendering them into evidence. While it
is possible that the reporter did not take down this part
of the proceedings, it is difficult to have an opinion
on this question at this late date. The record is silent
and it is not know whether the exhibits were or were
not authenicated, were or were not offered, and were
or were not withdrawn. There are signatures of counsel
on the exhibit sheet evidencing the fact that if the same
were admitted in evidence, the same have been withdrawn by counsel.
POINT IV
THE PLAINTIFFS HA VE FAILED TO FOLLOW
THE STATUTORY REMEDY PROVIDED FOR THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LIQUIDATION OF TRUST DEEDS.
If the plaintiffs have an evidence of indebtedness,
it is at best a Trust Deed. The security of a trust deed
is to be liquidated in accordance with the provisions of
title 57, chapter 1, begining with paragraph 19 and ending
with paragraph 36 of the Utah Code, Annotated, 1953.
Admittedly in paragraph 23 of this title the plaintiff
is given the option to foreclose a trust deed like a
mortgage, but there is no record to indicate how and
when that option was exercised prior to filing the complaint, and if so, how the notice of that option was made
know to the appellants.
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POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING COSTS
EXPENSES AND ATTORNEYS FEES IN EXCESS OF'
THE LIMITATIONS SET FORTH BY STATUE.
The measure of the allowable costs, expenses, and
attorneys fees, in the aggregate, is set forth in Title 57,
Chapter 1, paragraph 31 of the Utah Code Annotated,
1953. This statute provides in part that the owner or
party in default may pay at any time prior to the time
the power of sale is exercised, or the decree of foreclosure is entered, the amount then due under the terms
of the trust deed (presumably the delinquent installments) plus ..... .
Costs and Expenses actually incurred in enforcing
the terms of such obligation or trust deed, and the
trustee's and attorney's fees actually incurred not
exceeding in the aggregate fifty dollars or one
half of one percent of the entire unpaid principal
sum secured, whichever is greater."
The necessary implication is that if the same is not
paid before entry of decree of foreclosure that the defaulting party will lose the right to reinstate the obligation by bringing current the past-due payments. It does
not imply however, that the obligee has a claim to more
than one half of one percent to pay the aggregate· costs,
expenses, and attorney's fees. This would limit the recovery of the plaintiff to its principal, accruing interest,
and $137.00 in costs and fees. If the court sees fit to vacate
the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter
for trial, the appellants will once again have the privilege
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of reinstating the trust deed by paying all delinquent
installments (if there are any) and 1/2 of 1% of $27,500.00,
minus whatever rents the plaintiff has collected on the
premises.
POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ALLOW THE
DEFENDANT A JURY TRIAL
The right to a jury trial in civil disputes involving
question of fact in an action at law is guaranteed by the
Constitution, by Statute, and by cases construing the
same. It is respectfully submitted that this case falls
within the preview of that protection.
POINT VII
SECURITY TITLE COMPANY IS NOT A PROPER
PARTY PLAINTIFF
Under the assumption that the evidences of indebtedness create a lien in the property to secure the payment
of the debt, the owner of the lien is the proper party
plaintiff in a foreclosure action. Under a trust deed, the
beneificary, Prudential Federal Savings and Loan, and
not Security Title Company would be the owner and
holder of the lien, making Prudential Federal a proper
party plaintiff, but not Security Title Company. It is
interesting to note that Security Title Company is both
a plaintiff and a defendant in the same action.
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POINT VIII
ELLIS J. ROBINSON AND ELIZA ANN ROBINSON ARE AT MOST ACCOMODATION MAKERS WHO
ARE RELEASED FROM LIABILITY IF THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE GRANTED EXTENSIONS AND INDULGENCES TO THE PRINCIPAL OBLIGOR, PAYLESS BUILDERS SUPPLY.
This issue of law, whether valid or not, would depend
upon the evidence to be adduced at a trial. It would have
to be proven that they were in fact accomodation makers
and that indulgences and extensions were granted. They
may not succeed in proving this point, but they should
not be denied the opportunity by the employment of
summary proceedings where such proceedings do not
correctly lie.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that in the above captioned matter the judgment of the trial court should be vacated and the matter remanded to the district court for
a determination of the facts in dispute. In connection
therewith the sheriff's sale should be aside and vacated.
'

Respectfully Submitted,
John El wood Dennett
Attorney for Appellants
1243 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

